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1 Introduction 
The notion of ‘country role models for development success’ can be interpreted as 
either selecting from among the present set of developing countries some examples of 
notable success for their peers to emulate or, alternatively, the past historical experience 
of already developed countries to provide templates for possible replication, in so far as 
changing circumstances will allow. The set of three countries to be discussed here are 
all at present highly developed, in terms of per capita GDP and associated indicators, 
with Ireland by far the most recent to join the ranks, while Switzerland was arguably the 
first country, with the possible exception of Belgium, which followed Britain into the 
Industrial Revolution as early as the first half of the 19th century. Japan of course 
famously became the first Asian country to successfully ‘modernize’, beginning with 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868. By 1905 it had defeated a European great power in the 
Russo-Japanese War and acquired an empire by occupying Taiwan in 1895 and Korea 
in 1910. Switzerland’s assemblage of small political entities, the ‘cantons’, were 
independent since the Middle Ages and politically unified in 1848. Ireland, on the other 
hand, like the vast majority of contemporary developing countries, was a colony that 
only became an independent republic in 1921. Switzerland has always had the 
disadvantage of being landlocked, but this is offset by the tremendous advantage of 
common borders with the three great continental states of France, Germany and Italy. 
Ireland is divided from Britain by a mere strip of water, while Japan’s proximity to 
China has exposed it to stimulating cultural influences since at least the early seventh 
century. It is easy to argue therefore that these three countries have a fortunate 
geographical location and a historical experience of sustained development that is so far 
removed from that of the typical developing country of today in South East Asia, Africa 
or Latin America that it would be futile to expect any feasible, currently relevant lessons 
to be learned by them from a study of that experience. I do believe, however, that there 
are some highly relevant general principles of development that are exemplified by the 
achievements of our three countries, and that it is in this sense that they can usefully 
serve as ‘country role models’ to the contemporary developing world. 
The topics on which all three of the papers (Kimura 2009; Teague 2009; Weder and 
Weder 2009) under review have relevant lessons to provide are (i) the role of the state, 
(ii) the importance of openness in the markets for both goods and the factors of 
production, (iii) education and human capital formation and (iv) flexibility and 
adaptability in economic policy formulation, particularly in relation to macroeconomic 
stability. 
2  Role of the state 
Switzerland, which was a relatively peaceful part of Europe since an agreement with 
France in 1516, was invaded by a French army in 1798 that brought the centralizing 
ideology of the French Revolution to a region of small independent communities, the 
thirteen cantons and associated territories, setting up what was known as the Helvetic 
Republic in an attempt to provide a more unified and modern administration on the 
French model. This proved unworkable in the light of Swiss traditions as was realized 
by Napoleon himself. The Congress of Vienna recognized a modified Swiss 
Confederation in 1815, with borders that have remained largely unchanged to the 
present day. Liberal reformers created a new federal constitution in 1848 with a 
bicameral structure modelled on that of the United States of America, establishing a   2
very loosely centralized regime that preserved extensive local autonomy. No less 
distinguished a political commentator than Alexis de Tocqueville described the creation 
of the modern Swiss constitution as ‘one people, composed of several races, speaking 
several languages, with several religious beliefs, various dissident sects, … two 
societies, one very old and the other very young, joined in marriage despite the age 
difference’ (Fritzsche 1996: 129). In this respect at least Switzerland has something in 
common with the many multiethnic and multiconfessional states of the developing 
world of today. 
The constitution of 1848 created a unified national market with a common currency, 
standardized weights and measures, a unified foreign trade policy and federal discretion 
over large scale public works, such as railways, with all Swiss cities connected by rail 
by 1862. Taxation, public education, criminal and civil law were largely entrusted to 
subsidiary authorities in accordance with Swiss tradition. This political framework has 
largely survived in its essentials to the present day. Weder and Weder (2009) rightly 
characterize Switzerland’s political system as a ‘highly contestable’ one, in Baumol’s 
sense of a system or market where a high degree of potential entry ensures competitive 
outcomes that preserve the interests of all individual voters and subsidiary political 
entities. The ‘direct democracy’ permits a right of referendum that is open to any group 
or cause that can collect 50,000 signatures, making political parties anxious to 
compromise before risking a delay or rejection of legislation as a result of a referendum. 
The US-style bicameral legislature requires a majority of both individual voters in the 
popular assembly and of cantons in the second chamber. Autonomy over taxation and 
local public goods such as schools leads, as they point out, not to a ‘race to the bottom’ 
with the lowest tax and service levels, but to a Tiebout-style diversity of choice between 
higher or lower provision of services and corresponding tax rates. Given Switzerland’s 
long experience with democracy and self-government this liberal provision of potential 
veto rights has not caused gridlock or paralysis, as it might have if introduced into 
polities with less wholesome traditions of political behaviour in the contemporary 
developing world. 
The modern era of Japanese economic development begins with the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868. The Meiji reformers had the arduous task of dismantling the remaining feudal 
elements of the Tokugawa era and opening the country to the new influences coming 
from the West, while at the same time preserving its political sovereignty and cultural 
identity. There is almost universal agreement that they accomplished this in a 
remarkably creative and effective way, but there is still considerable controversy about 
many aspects of this successful transition to modernity. The Meiji state unified the 
national administration, established a modern currency and banking system, put the 
public finances on a sound footing and built a strong army and navy that made it the 
most powerful state in East Asia before the First World War. In addition the state was 
responsible for introducing modern Western technology into the industrial, transport 
and communications sectors by setting up projects and bearing the initial losses before 
selling them on concessional terms to an emerging private sector, which included the 
large conglomerates known as the ‘zaibatsu’. One useful lesson for contemporary 
developing countries is the manner in which agriculture was taxed directly by a fixed 
percentage tax on the assessed value of land, which gave the farmer the incentive of the 
full market price of his crop, rather than by export taxes or marketing board 
manipulations that have been so prevalent more recently.   3
By the 1930s the Japanese state fell under the influence of extreme nationalist and 
militarist elements. Defense spending increased substantially and heavy industry was 
subsidized with a view to building up the country’s war potential. Military intervention 
took place in Manchuria and China and eventually Japan went to war with the Allied 
Powers. After notable initial successes the country was defeated and occupied after 
suffering devastating losses. The MacArthur administration, however, introduced 
several important reforms that enabled the country to recover the pre-war level of 
development after ten years, as Kimura (2009) notes. Growth continued at remarkably 
high rates and Japan became by 1990 the envy of the world, particularly for its dynamic 
manufacturing export sectors in electronics and automobiles. Much of this success was 
attributed to the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or MITI as it is 
popularly known, in operating a system of industrial policy which was supposed to 
infallibly ‘pick winners’ in new industries, to be nurtured and guided by the state though 
under private ownership. Admiration for the alleged success of MITI in these 
endeavours was widespread in the developing world, as indicated most prominently by 
the ‘Look East’ slogan of Dr. Mahathir in Malaysia. Kimura, however, indicates quite 
convincingly that the success of the new export industries such as automobiles came 
despite, not because of, the MITI interventions. The lesson here for developing 
countries is of course that if even the mighty MITI was unable to systematically select 
and promote new industries for export they should be careful about trying to emulate 
that example. 
Ireland is by far the most recent of the three ‘success stories’ that we have under review. 
The fate of the native Catholic Irish, as distinct from their Protestant Anglo-Irish 
overlords, had long been a tragic one, particularly during the potato famine of the 1840s 
that was only partly alleviated by a massive emigration to the United States. Black 
(1972: 194) says that ‘Ireland in the half century before the Great Famine presented the 
phenomena of economic underdevelopment in almost classic form’ and despite its 
connection to Britain probably had a per capita income not that much higher than 
contemporary Tokugawa Japan and certainly lower than Switzerland. Independence 
from Britain in 1921 was followed by continued dissension and conflict, and the Great 
Depression and the Second World War also prevented any sustained economic progress. 
Attempts at self-sufficiency and economic separation from Britain also had largely 
negative consequences. It was only from the mid 1950s, as Teague (2009) points out, 
that sound and consistent economic policies began to be framed, which got a substantial 
boost from EU grants for infrastructure. Despite these efforts Fitzpatrick (1989: 229) 
said that ‘Ireland is still one of the poorest parts of Western Europe and seems likely to 
remain so’. Teague notes that Irish GNP per capita was only 67 per cent of the EU 
average in 1990, barely above the 64 per cent that it was in 1970. Since then, however, 
it has been ‘nothing short of spectacular’, averaging 10 per cent per annum in the 
second half of the 1990s, so that it was 96 per cent of the EU average in 2000 and about 
7 per cent above it today, making Ireland one of the richest countries in Europe, indeed 
second only to Luxembourg in a recent estimate. The keys to this remarkable success 
have been a number of critical steps taken by the state in the fields of policy towards 
trade, FDI, education and stabilization policy that we will examine later in this paper. 
3 Openness 
All three countries have been highly open during the most successful phases of their 
development, with Switzerland as the most consistently so. A small, landlocked   4
country, it had to rely for centuries on external markets for its goods and services. In 
medieval and early modern times it was the services of its mercenary soldiers, the most 
formidable infantry on the battlefields of Europe, whose earnings bolstered the meagre 
incomes of its peasants and artisans. Then the famous watch industry, created by 
Huguenot refugees who brought it to Geneva from where it spread gradually to the Jura 
and the canton of Neuchatel, captured most of the European markets and went even 
further afield. Fritzsche (1996) reports the remarkable fact that by 1850 two-thirds of 
the entire world market, a full million watches, was produced in the Jura regions alone. 
As the economic historian Biucchi (1973: 647) says ‘Swiss industry was born to export 
and born free’. He also observes (ibid.: 648) that ‘harassed by Napoleonic protection 
and the continental blockade, Swiss industry had the ready intuition to seek its 
salvation, in the midst of the Industrial Revolution, by integration into the world 
economy’. He quotes a contemporary source to the effect that exclusion from nearby 
European markets forced Swiss exporters to venture to ‘Persia, Astrakhan, Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, New York, Rio de Janeiro and Havana’. 
The textile sector, first silk but later and more importantly cotton, was the major branch 
of Swiss industry throughout the 19th century, and provided the bulk of exports. In 1800 
cotton textiles employed about 100,000 workers, about half of total manufacturing 
employment Fritzsche (1996). British machine-spun yarn replaced the local hand-spun 
sources and maintained the competitiveness of the weaving sector in the face of stiff 
British competition, before Swiss producers established their own mechanized spinning 
factories after 1830. The same source also says that exports were about one-third of 
national income from about 1850 to 1913, with about three-quarters of these going to 
overseas markets, largely the Americas, remarkable for a landlocked country. By later 
in the 19th century the Swiss industry became more oriented to ‘high-tech’ sectors like 
mechanical engineering and chemicals, but these themselves developed out of earlier 
roots in the textile industries, textile machinery in the first case and dyes for the silk 
industry in the second, important instances of ‘forward linkage’. Food processing, 
including the famous Nestle chocolate, was another important new industrial and export 
sector. Banking and financial services also emerged as major sectors on the world stage. 
Weder and Weder (2009) consider a high degree of market or ‘economic competition’ 
as being one of the two key factors, along with political contestability, that were 
responsible for Swiss success. This factor in turn can be seen as the outcome of the 
almost complete openness, with the notable exception of agriculture, that the economy 
has maintained for so long and with such consistency. In line with what we have already 
noted they point out that major sectors such as chemicals, textiles, watches and 
chocolate had over 90 per cent of output exported in most cases in 1920. Their Table 4 
shows Switzerland as fourth on the index of globalization in 2005, and first by a wide 
margin over the UK in capital stock owned abroad as a percentage of GDP, a 
remarkable 107 per cent as compared with 63 per cent for the UK. Switzerland is also 
first in ‘global migration intensity’. 
Japan became exposed to global trade influences by contact with the Portuguese and 
Dutch in the 16th century, who brought Chinese raw silk into the country in exchange 
for large flows of silver from Japanese mines. Japanese merchants also traded actively 
with South East Asia. The Tokugawa regime, however, eventually introduced the 
famous exclusion policy that limited European contact to a small Dutch outpost on the 
island of Deshima near Nagasaki. Trade with the West did not resume until the forcible 
opening of the country by Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’ in the 1850s. Raw silk and   5
tea, followed later by cotton textiles, were the main exports. Raw silk was consistently 
above 30 per cent of total exports from the beginning of the Meiji Era to the beginning 
of the 1930s. Tea fell from about a quarter in the early 1870s to below 10 per cent in the 
1890s, becoming insignificant thereafter. Cotton fabrics emerged only around 1900 but 
then rose sharply to nearly 20 per cent by the 1920s and 1930s, with over half of the 
total production being exported. The export of machinery rose from barely 1 per cent in 
1935 to nearly 6 per cent by 1938. Japan’s growth rates of industrial production and 
manufactured exports were both around 9 per cent per annum from 1911–3 to 1926–9, 
the highest in the world. After the Second World War the industrial growth rate was 
over 12 per cent and the export growth rate a remarkable 19 per cent per annum during 
the 1950s, well above the West German ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ performance of 8 per cent 
and 14 per cent for the same indicators during this period (see Shinohara 1964). 
Shinohara also mentions some special factors that contributed to the rapid growth of 
Japanese exports during these earlier years. One was the lack of tariff autonomy which 
imposed a virtual free trade regime due to the ‘unequal treaties’, which allowed many 
traditional industries to collapse and permit the rapid growth of raw silk and tea exports; 
the silkworm disease in Europe that fostered the further growth of raw silk exports; the 
decline in the value of silver relative to gold that acted like a sustained exchange rate 
depreciation stimulating exports, and perhaps most important of all, a combination of 
rapid productivity growth combined with low wages that gave Japan a strong edge 
against Asian and European competitors. 
Kimura (2009) takes the view that Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War was 
essentially in the same position as today’s newly industrialized countries at the start of 
their development. We should not forget, however, that though the physical and human 
costs of the war may have lowered statistical measures of economic status to 
comparable levels, the institutional memory of Japanese businesses and government 
agencies of their earlier impressive achievements must have contributed significantly to 
their success in not only reconstruction and recovery but in taking the economy to new 
heights that it had never reached before. Exports increasingly shifted their composition 
from textiles and iron and steel to sophisticated machinery and transport equipment, 
which constituted about 60 per cent by 1985 according to Figure 10 of Kimura’s paper, 
while imports became dominated by petroleum, accounting for over 40 per cent. In 
other words Japan ascended to the top rungs of the ‘ladder of comparative advantage’ 
during this period. Trade policy initially relied heavily on direct administrative controls 
before gradually being replaced by tariffs, which sharply fell from a peak of 8 per cent 
in 1963 (measured as a ratio of customs duties to total imports) to just 2 per cent 20 
years later. 
During these years much was made by both admirers, such as Chalmers Johnson, and 
critics such as Karel van Wolferen, of MITI’s efforts at guiding Japanese development 
by means of a sophisticated industrial policy, controlling the entry and exit of firms and 
their choice of product mix and technology to promote exports and the penetration of 
foreign markets in a mercantilist fashion. Kimura argues essentially that while MITI did 
make strenuous efforts in this direction, the beneficial results were obtained not because 
of, but despite these efforts. The main example he gives is regarding the automobile 
sector. Here MITI wanted to have a sole supplier for a single small model to take 
advantage of economies of scale but the industry ended up with multiple firms and 
models, some of which were extraordinarily successful while others failed. As he says, 
MITI’s main error was to consistently underestimate the dynamism of the private sector.   6
While I tend personally to share his skepticism about industrial policy I am sure that its 
many enthusiasts will not be convinced. 
Unlike both Switzerland and Japan, Ireland’s path to global integration has largely been 
through a massive inflow of FDI, beginning in around 1960. In this respect Ireland 
resembles Singapore more than any other country. Teague (2009) says that Ireland’s 
long affair with FDI started in the 1960s and since then attracting multinationals has 
been the backbone of economic development in the country. This came after a 
realization by the mid-1950s that the earlier attempts at import substitution and self-
sufficiency, familiar as nationalist reactions to a painful colonial past, had been 
counterproductive. Protectionism was given up and a lowering of tariff barriers was 
undertaken in the effort to integrate Ireland more closely with the European and world 
economy. A major new state entity, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), was 
created with a broad mandate to attract foreign firms into the country by tax concessions 
and other financial incentives. These measures by themselves would not have been 
significant had they not been backed up by the appeal of a young, well-educated and 
English-speaking work force at relatively low wages by European standards. The tax 
rate was at 10 per cent of profits on exports, which made Ireland very competitive as a 
destination for FDI. The proportion of GNP produced by foreign firms rose from about 
just 2 per cent in 1960 to 16 per cent by 1973, about 40 per cent of industrial output. 
The investment was initially in mainly in low-tech, relatively labour-intensive sectors 
that created employment opportunities to offset contractions in the agricultural sector. 
By the 1970s however IDA took steps to shift the composition of FDI towards higher-
tech sectors such as engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and then electronic 
and computing firms whose demands for skilled labour were met by appropriate 
educational measures to provide a matching supply. By 1990 FDI was accounting for 
two-thirds of manufacturing employment, with the number of foreign firms increasing 
from 650 in 1986 to over a thousand by 1997, a year in which manufacturing production 
increased by 16 per cent. An International Financial Services Centre in Dublin also 
attracted more FDI. As Teague (2009: table 1) shows, the US is by far the major source 
of all FDI in Ireland, accounting for almost half the firms and about 70 per cent of 
employment. He also points out that IDA takes considerable pains to design specific, 
customized incentive packages for the foreign firms that it particularly wants to attract, 
rather than simply offering general, across-the-board measures. In this respect IDA 
could be said to engage in a selective industrial policy that ‘picks winners’, so far 
apparently with a great deal of success.  
Teague interestingly also observes that ‘FDI has led to the diffusion within Ireland of 
advanced technological innovations and production methods as well as state-of-the-art 
organizational and managerial practices: multinationals have helped upgrade the Irish 
business environment’ (Teague 2009: 11). Ireland thus provides another instance of the 
role of FDI in promoting technology transfer to domestic firms by giving them 
examples to emulate and imitate, as argued in Findlay (1978). 
The other main component of Ireland’s strategy of openness has been its entry into the 
EU. Even before joining the EU in 1973 Teague says that Ireland took steps to prepare 
for the shock of entry by lowering trade restrictions unilaterally and also by the 1965 
Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement. He reports that the favourable trade creation effects of 
the customs union outweighed the unfavourable trade diversion effects. As part of the 
necessary restructuring, 20 per cent of domestic firms in mature industries went out of 
business, but the loss of employment was more than compensated by the dynamic new   7
sectors opened up by the FDI. The EU membership reinforced the attractiveness of 
Ireland for FDI from the US as a platform from which to penetrate the market of the 
union as a whole. Another benefit of EU membership was to end Ireland’s long 
attachment to the UK by reorienting the trade patterns toward the continent instead, a 
result that the earlier attempts at economic independence to accompany the political 
independence of 1921 had not been able to accomplish. This has given the Irish a new 
‘European’ identity to offset that of the colonial past under British hegemony. Irish 
farmers were also able to benefit from the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. The 
EU Structural Funds enabled Ireland to considerably expand and modernize its 
infrastructure, which also enhances the attractiveness as an FDI destination. 
4  Education and human capital 
Fritzsche (1996: 136) observes that during the 19th century ‘in comparison with the rest 
of Europe, the degree of literacy was remarkably high: there can hardly be any doubt 
that human capital was the mainstay and the most important stimulating factor of the 
economic growth’. This enabled Switzerland to enter the Industrial Revolution on at 
least equal terms with Great Britain but also to enter new high-tech fields such as 
engineering, chemicals and the pharmaceutical industry. Japan, on the eve of the Meiji 
Restoration, is reputed to have had, according to an estimate of R. P. Dore, 40 to 50 per 
cent of boys and 15 per cent of girls receiving formal schooling outside of the home. 
Kimura (2009: figure 4) indicates universal primary education existing by 1948 at least, 
while upper secondary school enrolment increased from 40 per cent in 1950 to over 90 
per cent by 1985 and university and junior college enrolment rose from 10 per cent in 
1954 to just under 30 per cent in 1985. His figure 5 shows the number of ‘researchers’ 
increasing from about 50,000 in the early 1950s to almost ten times that number by 
1985. 
Teague says that Ireland’s development in the 1950s was held back by a very poor 
educational system in which over 50 per cent of children left school at the age of 13, 
what he calls ‘an appalling figure compared to the rest of Europe’. It was only in 1967 
that secondary level education was provided free. Since then the country has invested 
heavily in education and caught up rapidly with the rest of the Europe. Nearly 60 per 
cent of students are now staying on for some form of tertiary education, a sixfold 
increase over the past 30 years. Very significantly, Ireland is shifting the focus of its 
tertiary education increasingly to ‘Institutes of Technology’, which now account for half 
of all students at this level. It is the graduates of these institutions that are providing the 
skilled labour force for the FDI and domestic firms engaged in electronics and other 
high-tech sectors. Even more remarkably there was a tenfold increase in the number of 
computer science graduates over five years. The coordination between educational 
institutions and development agencies is very notable. Taken together all these 
educational improvements are estimated to have added at least 1 per cent to the annual 
growth rate of the country.  
5 Macroeconomic  stability 
Although usually considered a short run problem, the sustained maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability is increasingly recognized as an important determinant of long 
term developmental success. All three of the countries reviewed here provide strong   8
evidence in favour of this view. Switzerland has been renowned for its financial stability 
for centuries, with traditionally low rates of not only inflation but unemployment as 
well, due to the flexibility of its labour markets combined with conservative monetary 
and banking policies. Japan resorted to deficit financing early in the Meiji Era before 
the famous Matsukata Deflation of the 1880s set the country on a more orthodox 
monetary-fiscal path up to the Great Depression. Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi, 
who has been described as ‘a Keynesian before Keynes’, taking office in 1931, 
combined an expansionary fiscal policy with exchange rate depreciation to give Japan a 
higher level of economic activity and employment than any other major economy 
during the first half of the 1930s before he was murdered in 1936, with military 
spending and the outbreak of war with China in 1937 leading to further expansion and 
even the emergence of inflation for the rest of the decade. The war and post-war phases 
of the 1940s were financially chaotic before an effective stabilization policy with a 
unified exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar was adopted under the so-called Dodge 
Plan of 1949. Since then Japan has for the most part pursued conservative monetary and 
fiscal policies, perhaps excessively so in the opinion of some observers. 
Ireland as a more typical small open economy has the most relevant experience for 
lessons to developing countries. As Teague says reliance on naïve Keynesian policies in 
response to the oil shock of the early 1970s did not increase employment, but only 
increased inflation and the public debt, so that by the middle of the 1980s 
unemployment was 18 per cent, inflation 15 per cent and the public debt 16 per cent of 
the GNP. Starting in 1987 the government put the country on a more austere monetary-
fiscal path, cemented by membership in the Euro zone. Teague also mentions the 
important role that the idea of ‘social partnership’, government mediating between 
business and labour, has played in maintaining macroeconomic stability. 
6  What are the lessons? 
We conclude by briefly summarizing what the experience of these three already 
developed countries has to teach the developing countries of today. From Switzerland 
the most important thing that they can learn is that religious, linguistic and other cultural 
differences between various segments of the population can be overcome by peaceful 
political compromise, despite a brief civil war in the 1840s. Adam Smith said that little 
was required for a state to prosper beyond ‘peace, easy taxes and a tolerable 
administration of justice’. A better illustration of his contention than Switzerland would 
be difficult to find, but Japan also has an excellent record in this respect. After the 
Tokugawa Shogunate ended the period of ‘Warring States’ in the early 1600s, the 
country has been free from civil war, with the exception of the Satsuma Rebellion of 
1877. The state in both Switzerland and Japan took good care of the provision of 
essential infrastructure, but in Japan it had to play a far more active role in adopting 
modern technology and institutions after 1868 to close the gap with the West. Despite 
the exaggerated claims for MITI and industrial policy, the private sector has played the 
main role in Japanese economic development. Both countries have also consistently 
maintained macroeconomic stability. Ireland is a relative latecomer, and its long status 
as a colonial dependency of Great Britain also makes this case the most relevant of the 
three for contemporary developing countries. Inward FDI has been the main engine of 
growth for Ireland, unlike Switzerland and Japan that both relied more on their own 
domestic private sectors. Ireland, however, has not been a mere passive recipient of FDI 
but has actively filtered and channelled it through the agency of IDA, which would be a   9
more relevant role model for developing countries to follow than the much better known 
and vaunted MITI.  
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